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FOREWORD: ACADEMIC INFLUENCE ON THE COURT 
Neal Kumar Katyal∗ 
HE months leading up to the Supreme Court’s blockbuster de-
cision on the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were characterized 
by a prodigious amount of media coverage that purported to ana-
lyze how the legal challenge to Obamacare went mainstream. The 
nation’s major newspapers each had a prominent story describing 
how conservative academics, led by Professor Randy Barnett, had 
a long-term strategy to make the case appear credible.1 In the first 
weeks after the ACA’s passage, the storyline went, the lawsuit’s 
prospects of success were thought to be virtually nil. Professor (and 
former Solicitor General) Charles Fried stated that he would “eat a 
T 
 
* Paul & Patricia Saunders Professor, Georgetown University. Professor Katyal 
served as Acting Solicitor General of the United States and was lead counsel in sev-
eral cases that are discussed in this Foreword, including Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006); Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011); Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 
391 (4th Cir. 2011); and Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 
2011). The views expressed herein are his alone. 
1 See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, On Healthcare, Time for Some Judicial Restraint, L.A. 
Times, Mar. 27, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/27/opinion/la-oe-kinsley-
health-care-mandate-supreme-court-20120327; James B. Stewart, How Broccoli 
Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2012, at A1; Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Vindication for Challenger of Health Care Law, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 27, 2012, at A1; Ezra Klein, Obamacare’s Most Influential Legal Critic 
on Tuesday’s Oral Arguments, Ezra Klein’s Wonkblog, Mar. 27, 2012, 4:52 PM, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/obamacares-most-influential-
legal-critic-on-tuesdays-oral-arguments/2011/08/25/gIQAq2NpeS_blog.html. 
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hat . . . made of Kangaroo skin” if the challenge were successful.2 
But, as the case went through the system, the predictions evolved 
to the point where many believed that the ACA would be struck 
down.3 A (rapidly diminishing) group of observers maintained their 
prediction that the ACA would be upheld, but even then, most of 
those individuals focused exclusively on Commerce Clause 
grounds.4 
In the midst of this speculation came an important article by 
Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel arguing that the ACA should be 
upheld as a valid exercise of the tax power.5 They argued—in a 
draft placed online two months before the oral argument in the 
case—that there was a key distinction between penalties and taxes. 
Applying that framework, they argued that the ACA was not a 
penalty because penalties have the effect of preventing conduct 
(thereby producing little revenue) and the ACA’s minimum cover-
age provision, by contrast, was projected to raise oodles of reve-
nue. It is fair to say that this article had little to no impact on the 
media predictions that were being bandied about as the case 
wound its way through the Supreme Court. The Commerce Clause 
remained everyone’s focus. 
One person, however, turned out to be looking in a different di-
rection: the Chief Justice of the United States. There has been a 
good deal of commentary about whether the Chief Justice was in-
fluenced by the Cooter/Siegel article.6 To be sure, there are many 
2 Igor Volksy, Reagan’s Solicitor General Promises to ‘Eat a Hat Made of Kangaroo 
Skin’ if Courts Repeal Health Care Law, ThinkProgress, Apr. 15, 2010, 4:40 PM, 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2010/04/15/171390/fried-unconstitutional/. 
3 See Bob Drummond, Obama Health Law Seen Valid, Scholars Expect Rejection, 
Bloomberg, June 22, 2012, 12:15 PM, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-
22/law-experts-say-health-measure-legal-as-some-doubt-court-agrees.html. 
4 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Why Scalia Could Uphold Obamacare, The Atlantic, 
Apr. 13, 2012, 11:38 AM, http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/04/why-
scalia-could-uphold-obamacare/255791/. 
5 Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory 
of the Tax Power, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1195 (2012) (first posted Jan. 23, 2012 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989537). 
6 E.g., Brian Leiter, Cooter & Siegel: The Real Originators of the Tax Power Theory 
for Upholding the ACA, Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports, July 10, 2012, 8:47 AM, 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2012/07/cooter-siegel-the-real-originators-of-
the-tax-power-theory-for-upholding-the-aca.html; Jeffrey Rosen, Welcome to the Rob-
erts Court: How the Chief Justice Used Obamacare to Reveal His True Identity, The 
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similarities (most prominently the Chief Justice’s emphasis on the 
size and effect of the exaction as being crucial components of de-
termining whether something is a constitutionally permissible tax, 
and his view that taxes generally raise revenue while dampening 
but not ceasing the conduct).7 That question can only be resolved 
through shadowy investigative journalism, or perhaps via release of 
the Justices’ papers at some point in the future. We simply cannot 
know right now. But the inquiry being waged around the 
Cooter/Siegel article (an article that is important in its own right) 
sets up the question of whether and how constitutional theory im-
pacts the Court. 
It is commonly thought that law review articles today have little 
impact on “the real world.” The Chief Justice has famously re-
marked: 
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article 
is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evi-
dentiary approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something, 
which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, 
but isn’t of much help to the bar.8 
Citation counts bear this out as well, with citations to law reviews 
in Supreme Court opinions over the last decade dropping signifi-
cantly.9 
The plaintiffs’ strategy to attack the ACA, however, was not an 
attempt by an academic to influence the Court solely through law 
review articles. Rather, they employed a massive PR blanket—
including think tank presentations, congressional testimony, media 
outreach, and blogging. In that sense, the strategy was very similar 
New Republic, June 29, 2012, 9:40 AM, http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/104493/welcome-
the-roberts-court-who-the-chief-justice-was-all-along. 
7 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595–2600 (2012). 
8 Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds After Chief Justice Roberts Disses Le-
gal Scholarship, ABA Journal, Jul. 7, 2011, 5:29 AM, http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/law_prof_responds_after_chief_justice_roberts_disses_legal_scholarship/. 
9 Brent Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First-Century 
Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 Drexel L. Rev. 399, 415 (2012). 
Newton found that “[t]he current justices have cited law review articles less fre-
quently than their predecessors did in the three decades before, which suggests that 
the current Justices may view current law review scholarship as less useful than the 
members of the Court did a generation ago.” Id. at 416. 
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to the strategy I used in “litigating” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.10 Yes, 
there was a deep and crucial legal component to my argument—
months of hard research and mastery of the materials of interna-
tional and domestic law—that manifested themselves first in law 
review articles.11 But in Hamdan, as I think with National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius, there was a recognition by 
the challengers that a law review article was not going to turn the 
legal landscape against the President’s strong view of the matter. 
On something that massive, it was reasonable to expect that the 
Justices would view the case through several different lenses. In 
Hamdan, one of those lenses was the way the rest of the world 
viewed the case (leading to an international strategy),12 and one 
was the way American citizens viewed it (leading to a domestic 
strategy).13 
Barnett and his colleagues pursued a similar path—with aca-
demic writing being only one aspect of the strategy to bring credi-
bility to the constitutional challenge. And ultimately, the strategy 
was successful with respect to the Commerce Clause. Despite the 
fact that the Court had not drawn an activity/inactivity distinction 
(and despite the fact that cases such as Wickard v. Filburn some-
what undermined it),14 the challengers were able to garner the sup-
10 See 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
11 Neal K. Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Mili-
tary Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259 (2002). 
12 E.g., Brief for 422 Current and Former Members of the United Kingdom and 
European Union Parliaments as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hamdan, 548 
U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 42097 (arguing that military commissions violate in-
ternational law). 
13 E.g., Brief for Certain Former Federal Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 53990 (same); Brief for General 
David Brahms and General James Cullen as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 42060 (arguing that the Authorization 
to Use Military Force Resolution does not authorize military commissions); Brief for 
Richard A. Epstein et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 
557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 42067 (same). 
14 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2619 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[C]ontrary to the Chief Justice’s conten-
tion, our precedent does indeed support ‘[t]he proposition that Congress may dictate 
the conduct of an individual today because of prophesied future activity.’ In Wickard, 
the Court upheld a penalty the Federal Government imposed on a farmer who grew 
more wheat than he was permitted to grow . . . .” (second alteration in original) (cita-
tion omitted)). 
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port of both the Chief Justice15 and four of his colleagues.16 It was a 
remarkable achievement—for the first time in many decades, the 
Court had said that landmark legislation could not be pursued un-
der the Commerce Clause. (The Court had, of course, invalidated 
statutes in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 
but the statutes at issue in those cases are not comparable in their 
gravity.)17 
However, even with five votes, the Commerce Clause reasoning 
turned out not to matter. The Chief Justice, joined by his four 
other colleagues, upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the tax 
power. To the extent the Cooter/Siegel model influenced the Court 
and contributed to this result, it worked through a different path 
than Barnett’s. It harkened back to the older model of academics 
influencing the Court by dint of their writing. Perhaps the best 
known recent example is Charles Reich’s The New Property, which 
led to Goldberg v. Kelly.18 Henry Hart’s Dialogue19 and Paul Ba-
tor’s Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners20 are others. (One may, of course, go back even further, 
to the Joseph Story era.)21 In this (traditional) model, the solitary 
scholar writes something of influence and distinction, thereby pro-
viding a new way for a Justice to conceptualize a problem. 
15 Id. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The individual mandate, however, does 
not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become 
active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so 
affects interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to 
regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and 
potentially vast domain to congressional authority.”). 
16 Id. at 2644–50 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing). 
17 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000). 
18 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (citing Charles Reich, The New 
Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964)). 
19 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953). The Supreme 
Court cited Hart’s Dialogue eleven times between 1968 and 2001. See, e.g., Jean v. 
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 876 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
20 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963). The Supreme Court cited Bator twenty-two times be-
tween 1963 and 2009. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2008); 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 137 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); McCleskey v. Zant, 
499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991). 
21  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston, 
Little, Brown & Co. 1858) (1831). 
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For the last two decades, the legal academy has been embroiled 
in an overwrought debate concerning whether the turn to theory 
has been detrimental.22 The critics of theoretical scholarship some-
times miss the ways in which theory can influence solutions to legal 
problems.23 And the supporters sometimes overstate their case, ne-
glecting the cost of a legal professoriate that is increasingly unable 
to talk to judges (or even to their own graduates). But that debate 
is only one aspect of a larger set of questions about what, in fact, 
influences judges. What creates the constitutional atmospherics 
necessary to give an argument credibility? Is it great litigators (and 
great oral arguments)? Is it simple and elegant arguments? Or do 
judges have their minds made up already? And if they do, what 
made these judges make their minds up? Their upbringing? Their 
economic circumstances? Their race, gender, orientation, or relig-
ion? Their experience as a lawyer before they ascended to the 
bench? How does what they watch on television matter—think 
MSNBC or Fox News? How about what they read—from the New 
York Times to the Virginia Law Review? These questions are as 
hard to answer at a general level as the specific question of 
whether Cooter and Siegel influenced the Sebelius opinion. And 
yet everyone seems to have an opinion about it. In one sense, it is 
no surprise that many litigators tend to think lawyering matters a 
lot, and academics do not; each has a vested interest in seeing 
themselves as creating value. 
Yet litigators trudge on, day after day, polishing their briefs and 
rehearsing their oral arguments. They do this despite the doubts 
that maybe their efforts will not matter. And it is here that Cooter 
and Siegel teach us a similar lesson: despite the doubts about schol-
arship altering litigation outcomes, the efforts are worth it, because 
sometimes they very well may alter those outcomes. Cooter and 
Siegel, following in the footsteps of Charlie Reich, Henry Hart, and 
others, remind us that, at its best, legal scholarship can be deeply 
relevant to the real-world practice of law. 
22 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 34 (1992). 
23 Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 
120 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 67 (2006). 
